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1. INTRODUCTION
On many occasions, individuals are able to coordinate their actions. The
first empirical evidence to this effect has been described by Schelling
(1960) in an informal experiment. His results were corroborated many
years later by Mehta et al. (1994a,b) and Bacharach and Bernasconi
(1997). From the point of view of mainstream game theory, the success of
individuals in coordinating their actions is something of a mystery. If
there are two or more strict Nash equilibria, mainstream game theory
has no means of explaining why people tend to choose their part of one
and the same equilibrium. Textbooks (see, e.g., Rasmusen, 1989 and
Kreps, 1990) refer to the fact that players may use focal points (see
Schelling (1960)) or social conventions (see Lewis (1969)). Both notions
cannot easily be incorporated into mainstream game theory, however.
The notion of social conventions has recently been extensively studied in
the context of evolutionary game theory where a population of agents
interacts with each other. The central focus of this paper, however, is on
situations where a few players play a game only once and I study how
they may coordinate their actions.
Since Gauthier (1975), many authors have attempted to explain the
use of focal points in a framework that departs in one way or another
from mainstream game theory. Crawford and Haller (1990) try to explain
how rational individuals can use past play to learn to coordinate.
Bacharach (1993), Sugden (1995) and Janssen (2000) try to explain how
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individuals can use the labels of strategies to coordinate their actions.1
All these papers use variations of the Principle of Coordination, a term
introduced by Gauthier (1975).
To get an idea of the differences between the different versions let us
first look at the terms in which the different authors themselves phrase
the Principle. Gauthier (1975, p. 201) defines the Principle in the
following terms: `in a situation with one and only one outcome which is
both optimal and a best equilibrium, if each person takes every person to
be rational and to share a common conception of the situation, it is
rational for each person to perform that action which has the best
equilibrium as one of the possible outcomes'. Crawford and Haller (1990,
p. 580) `maintain the working hypothesis that players play an optimal
. . . strategy combination', which is defined as a strategy combination
that maximizes both players' repeated-game pay-offs.2 Similarly, the
technical notion Bacharach (1993, p. 266) employs has players choosing
an equilibrium strategy combination that is not strictly pay-off domi-
nated by another equilibrium strategy combination. Finally, Janssen
(2000) uses a principle, which basically says that if there is a unique
Pareto-efficient outcome, then rational players will choose their part of it.
The main difference between these alternative uses of the Principle
of Coordination is whether or not it applies to games that have mutiple
pay-off equivalent Nash equilibria. Crawford and Haller (1990) and
Bacharach (1993) interpret the Principle as saying that players can
coordinate on one of the Pareto-undominated Nash equilibia. Gauthier
(1975) and Janssen (2000), on the other hand, use the Principle more
narrowly as applying only to games with a unique Pareto-efficient Nash
equilibrium. Another difference relates to whether the Principle applies
when none of the Nash equilibria of the game is Pareto-efficient.
Bacharach's notion seems to select the most efficient equilibrium even if
it is Pareto-dominated.3 Gauthier, on the other hand, restricts the use of
the Principle to cases where there is a unique Pareto-efficient outcome,
which is then also a Nash equilibrium.4
The different versions of the Principle of Coordination are not
uncontroversial. The Principle has been criticized by Gilbert (1989, 1990),
among others. The purpose of this article is not to remove all controversy.
Rather, the purpose is to clarify the discussion by showing that one
version of the Principle follows from some axioms about considerations
individual players have when choosing their actions. The discussion
1 An overview of this literature is given in Janssen (1998a).
2 The paper restricts attention to attainable strategies. As this concept is not important for
my purposes, I have not mentioned it in the definition introduced in the main text.
3 I say `seems' as the paper does not discuss games where this is relevant.
4 Sugden's principle is a little more subtle and will be discussed in Section 3.
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about the use of the Principle can then proceed by arguing whether or
not these axioms are intuitively appealing and whether or not we should
abandon the variations of the Principle that cannot be derived from these
axioms. The analysis below provides support for the Principle of
Coordination only in so far as there is a unique, strict Pareto-efficient
outcome and the basic idea of the rationalization is that each player
individually forms a plan specifying how each player will play the game
and which conjecture to hold about the opponent's play. The axioms that
are postulated are at the level of these individual plans. We show that
these axioms are such that if there is a unique strict Pareto-efficient
outcome, then there is a unique plan how to play the game. As the plan
is unique, both players thinking individually will play according to the
same plan and the Pareto-efficient outcome results.
The problem of coordination is different from the problem of
cooperation as exhibited, for example, in the prisoner's dilemma. As
defection is the dominant strategy, one has to depart from the axiom of
individual rationality in order to explain cooperation in the prisoner's
dilemma. That is not the case for the problem of coordination: in order to
explain that individual players will coordinate an approach consistent
with the traditional axioms of individual rationality may be taken. The
difference between the problem of coordination and the problem of
cooperation is clearly recognized by Gauthier, for example. In his article
Coordination, Gauthier (1975, p. 199) briefly mentions the prisoner's
dilemma and the wish of agents to agree on a principle that yields an
optimal outcome. He then says
insofar as they seek to do so, their problem is one, not of coordination but
of cooperation ± acting together to secure a mutual benefit unavailable to
those who act independently to secure individual benefit. This problem is
not our concern. We shall restrict discussion to situations where it is not
advantageous or not possible to cooperate in attaining an optimal non-
equilibrium outcome.
The Principle of Coordination that he sets forth, which is quoted at the
beginning of this article, only applies to situations in which there is `one
and only one outcome which is both optimal and a best equilibrium'.
Hence, this principle does not apply to prisoner's dilemma games which
have more than one optimal (read: Pareto-efficient) outcome and
Gauthier leaves a discussion of the problem of cooperation to his Morals
by Agreement (1986). The present paper also restricts attention to
coordination issues.
One approach to arguing in favour of the Principle of Coordination
is based on the idea that when playing a (coordination) game individuals
should regard themselves as members of a team. Team thinking has
recently been studied by Sugden (1991, 2000) and Hollis (1998), among
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others. Sugden (1991, p. 776) develops the notion of team rationality
within the tradition of regarding game theoretic solution concepts as
being formalized in a `book of recommendations for playing games
which is entirely authorative', the recommendation being addressed to
both players (rather than to each of the players individually). Sugden
(2000, p. 183) analyzes coordination issues between football players as an
example and introduces a coach making recommendations to the players
on how to coordinate their play. Despite some similarities (to which I
come later), the approach I take in this paper differs from the team
rationality approach in two important ways. First, in many actual
coordination problems there is no coach that is in the position to make
recommendations to both players, or to use Sugden's earlier metaphor,
there is no book of recommendations players can consult. Rather, each
player individually has to develop a view on how both players will play
the game and they individually have to look for arguments that support
this view. The arguments individual players seek are fomulated in the
axioms briefly mentioned above and which will be developed in more
detail below. In brief, the approach I take in this paper is that if the game
structure is such that there is only one view satisfying the axioms, then
the reasoning of individual players must result in the same view and,
hence, players will coordinate. A second difference is that the present
approach is more in line with mainstream game theory in the sense that I
require (as one of the axioms) a player's view on how to play the game
to be consistent with individual rationality. Hence, according to each
player's view each individual chooses an optimal action given the
conjectures about the opponent's play. This implies that the approach
advocated here cannot explain cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma.
The formal approach I take in this paper is related to an approach
advocated by Jacobson (1996) in this journal. Jacobson (1996) investigates
an alternative eductive foundation for the notion of Nash equilibrium.
He argues that players individually formulate a plan how a game will be
played. An individual plan specifies for each player a set of pure
strategies and a set of conjectures about the opponents' play. The
formulation of a plan incorporates the game theoretic idea that each
player not only thinks about what he himself is going to play, but also
imagines himself in the position of his opponent. In the present paper I
also take as a starting point the idea that individual players formulate a
view (plan) about how both players play the game and which conjectures
they have about the opponent's play. Like Jacobson I require a plan to be
rational, but instead of imposing a requirement of internal consistency I
require a plan to be optimal in the sense that a player will only adopt a
particular view (plan) if another rational plan that is strictly better for
both players does not exist. I show that the uniqueness version of the
Principle of Coordination follows from the two requirements (rationality
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and optimality) taken together. Hence, the present paper can be
considered as providing a justification for it.5
The approach towards the Principle of Coordination I want to
develop in this paper is a middle ground between mainstream game
theory with notions like individual preferences and individual ration-
ality, and the team rationality approach developing notions like `we-
thinking' and `team preferences'. Like the team rationality approach, I
regard the fact that players play (a game) together as implying that each
of the players realizes they have something in common, namely (at least)
the game they play, and that they depend on each other. This realization
on the part of the players materalizes in two ways. First, each player
formulates a plan about how, according to each of them, both players will
play the game and which conjectures both players hold about each
other's behaviour. Second, if a plan exists which is unambiguously in
everyone's interest, then the individual players will not hesitate to choose
their part of the plan. On the other hand, like traditional game theory, the
approach advocated here builds on the notions of individual preferences
and individual rationality. What is in a player's own interest is simply
defined by her own utility function and players only consider plans that
are consistent with standard individual rationality considerations.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the main
axioms; Section 3 gives a formal statement of the result; Section 4
provides a discussion; and Section 5 provides conclusions.
2. GAME STRUCTURE AND AXIOMS OF PLAY
The analysis that follows is built around the following two-player game.
There is a Row player and a Column player. Each of the two players has
a finite strategy space, denoted by SR, respectively SC, where
SR  f1; . . . ;mg and SC  f1; . . . ; ng. The pay-off to player i, i = R,C is
given by r; c, where r 2 SR and c 2 SC. The structure of the game,
including the pay-offs is common knowledge.
In this section I introduce three axioms on which the analysis is built.
The first two axioms are based on Jacobson (1996) and are quite
uncontroversial from the point of view of mainstream game theoretic
reasoning; the third axiom is new. The first axiom formulates the idea
that players plan what to do in their own situation and also imagine
5 Colman and Bacharach (1997) have recently provided another justification. They use a
Stackelberg heuristic which is defined as a way in which the players can conceive the game
as being played sequentially (whereas it is actually played simultaneously). A critique
that can be levelled against their approach is that coordination games are really
simultaneous move games and we know, from the standard game theoretic literature, that
simultaneous move games are rather different from sequential games. Hence, it is difficult
to explain why players would conceive of the simultaneous move game in sequential
terms.
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themselves in the situation of their opponent. In other words, when
playing a game, players realize that they depend on each other and,
therefore, they think about what the others may do and what they may
believe about themselves. Formally, a plan specifies for each player a set
of pure strategies that are motivated by the plan and a conjecture what
the other player will choose.
A1. Each player formulates a plan P with P  R; q; C; p, R  SR,
C  SC; q 2 C, and p 2 R, where R and C are the sets6 of pure strategies
motivated by P for the Row and Column player, respectively, while q and p
are the conjectures (about the opponent's play).
Not every plan is a reasonable plan. First, it seems reasonable to require
that a plan be such that the sets of strategies that are motivated by the plan
are best responses to the conjectures that are held about the other player's
play. This incorporates the idea that every player realizes that none of
them acts against their own interest. To this end, let us define by BCp and
BRq the set of pure strategies that are a best response to p, respectively q.
A2 formulates the first condition a reasonable plan has to fulfill.
A2. (Rationality). A plan P : R; q; C; p has to be such that the pure
strategies motivated by P are best replies to the conjecture held about the
opponent's play, i.e., R  BRq and C  BC  Bp.
It is clear (and convincingly argued by Gilbert (1990)) that the Principle
of Coordination does not follow from individual rationality considera-
tions alone. Hence, we have to be more restrictive and impose another
requirement that a reasonable plan has to fulfill. To this end, let us note
that BCp and Rq are finite sets so that for each plan P and for each
player i the minimum and the maximum pay-off associated with that
plan are well defined and we denote them by iP and iP
respectively. The third axiom requires that players only adopt plans that
are optimal. A plan P is considered to be an optimal plan if the
maximum pay-off both players get if they follow this plan is larger than
the minimum pay-off both players would get according to any
alternative plan satisfying A2.7 This is the content of A3.
A3. (Optimality). A player's plan P  R; q; C; p must be such that there
does not exist another plan P0  R0; q0; C0; p0 satisfying A2 such that
(i) iP0  iPfor i = 1,2 and
(ii) for each player i if iP0  iP, then iP0 > iP.
6 Note that the set of pure strategies R and C that are motivated by a plan need not be
singletons.
7 Here, I take a conservative view on optimality. One could defend a stronger criterion,
namely that a plan is reasonable if there does not exist another rational plan such that both
players receive a pay-off that is at least as large and at least one player gets a strictly larger
pay-off, i.e., condition (ii) below needs to hold for one player only.
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Note that A3 does not involve any team preferences (Sugden, 2000) or
`we-rationality'. The axiom is completely stated in terms of individual
preferences and can be considered to take place in an individual player's
mind. One reason A3 may be a reasonable axiom to impose on
individual plans is the following. Suppose that after the game has been
played, there is a (fair) chance the two players will meet and a discussion
ensue about the reasons the players had for their choices. Suppose,
moreover, that one player, Olga, used the Optimality criterion A3 to
guide her plan, and the other, Soren, chose a Suboptimal plan. Olga may
start the discussion by saying (somewhat angrily): `OK, Soren, I under-
stand you want to get the best pay-off for yourself and don't care too
much about the pay-off I get, and I also understand that there are many
choices we could make so that there is no a priori reason we should
coordinate our choices, but I don't understand why you sacrifice both
my pay-off and your own for . . . I don't know what'. Soren, somewhat
taken aback, may reply by saying: `I'm awfully sorry, I was thinking too
much about other considerations and failed to see that it is actually also
in my own interest to act differently from what I had planned for both of
us'. Moreover, before playing, the players may foresee such a dialogue
taking place after they have played the game in which the player who
followed the optimality criterion has reason to accuse the other of not
forming an optimal plan, while the other will be forced to apologize for
her behaviour. If players prefer not to be in a position where they have to
apologize, they will choose to opt for the optimality axiom A3.8,9
3. RESULTS
In this section I briefly point out the main implications of requiring a
reasonable plan to fulfill A1±A3. Before I do so, some terminology is
introduced. I will call an outcome strictly Pareto-efficient if the pay-off to
each of the players in this outcome is strictly larger than the pay-off to
each of them in any other outcome. Moreover, two plans P and P ' are
outcome equivalent if they support the same strategies, i.e., R = R ' and
C = C '.
8 This argument may be framed in terms of a simple normal form game with opting and not
opting for axiom A3 as the two possible choices. No matter whether the other player opts
for A3, it is better to opt for it if you prefer not to apologize. Hence, opting for A3 is a
dominant strategy.
9 The above argument bears some similarity to the argument put forward by Gilbert (1990,
p. 16), where she argues that an interchange may lay the foundations for players to jointly
accept a principle as `our' principle. The main difference with the approach above is that
the principle of optimality A3 is based on pay-off considerations and that people may
dislike to apologize. This makes the above argument more in the spirit of individual
rationality considerations than Gilbert's.
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A first result says that a plan satisfying A1±A3 always exists.
Formally, this result is trivial (and a proof is omitted), but it is
nevertheless interesting to note that its existence marks an important
difference from the approach taken by Sugden. Sugden (1995, p. 542)
defines a recommendation A* to be collectively rational if there exists a
pair of utilities u1; u2 such that if players choose strategies from A*,
they will get a utility outcome of u1; u2 while each of them gets a
strictly lower utility level if at least one of them chooses differently. He
then proceeds by defining the principle of collective rationality: if a
collectively rational recommendation exists, each player should act on
that recommendation. It is clear, however, that a collectively rational
recommendation does not always exist. To mark the contrast, I formally
state the first result.
Proposition 1. For any game considered here, a plan P  R; q; C; p
satisfying A1±A3 exists.
Proposition 2 below states the main result.
Proposition 2.10
(i) If there exists a strictly Pareto-efficient outcome, then the set of
plans satisfying A1±A3 is outcome equivalent and players will
coordinate on the Pareto-efficient outcome.
(ii) If the set of plans satisfying A1±A3 are outcome equivalent, then
players coordinate on the most efficient Nash equilibrium.
Proof. (i) If there exists a strictly Pareto-efficient outcome, then there are
 and  such that i;  > i0; 0 for i = 1,2 and for all 0 and 0 with
; 0 2 SR and ; 0 2 SC and ;  6 0; 0. Hence, ;  must be a Nash
equilibrium. Accordingly, there are conjectures p and q such that
P  ; p:; q satisfies A2. Moreover, all other plans that are not outcome
equivalent are suboptimal and, hence, do not satisfy (A3). Thus, the set
of plans satisfying A2 and A3 is outcome equivalent.
(ii) Suppose the set of plans satisfying A2 and A3 is outcome
equivalent. This implies that there exists a plan P  R; q; C; p such that
for all and p' and q' that are part of another plan P0  R0; q0; C0; p0 with
R0 6 R or C0 6 C satisfying A2, iP  iP0 for i = 1,2 and for each
player i if iP0  iP, then iP0 > iP. The fact that all plans
satisfying A1±A3 are outcome equivalent implies that R and C contain
10 If a stronger version of the optimality axiom A3 is used, then we can assert a stronger
version of this Proposition. In particular, we may then drop the `strictness' requirement
in part (i).
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just one strategy. It is also clear that if a Nash equilibrium is selected,
then it will be the most efficient one. Suppose, then, that on the contrary
(R,C) does not consitute a Nash equilibrium. Without loss of generality
assume that given the choice of the Column player, the Row player could
improve his position, that is, there exists an R' such that
RR0;C > RR;C. Take R' to be (one of) the best response(s) to C. It is
clear that (R',C) itself cannot be part of a plan satisfying A1±A3 as this
would violate the fact that the set of plans satisfying A2 and A3 is
outcome equivalent. So, suppose that there does not exist a plan that
satisfies A1±A3 that supports (R',C). As the plan supporting (R,C)
satisfies A3 and as RR0,C > RR,C, this would imply that no plan
exists supporting (R',C) that satisfies A2. It is easy to see, however, that
this also cannot be the case as (i) the plan supporting (R,C) satisfies A2
and so that certainly C can be supported as a rational choice and as (ii) R'
can be supported as it is the rational choice given the conjecture that the
other plays C. &
Note that Proposition 2 does not imply a Pareto-efficient outcome
result if axioms A1±A3 are satisfied. When there are multiple Pareto-
efficient outcomes, none of them may be compatible with the rational
choice of both players ± as in the prisoner's dilemma. Hence, the first
part of Proposition 2 does not guarantee that a Pareto-efficient outcome
results if players' plans satisfy A1±A3. In particular, applied to the
prisoner's dilemma, axioms A1±A3 only support the Pareto-dominated
Nash equilibrium.
Related to the different version of the Principle of Coordination, it is
also important to note that for many games there may, in addition, be
mutliple plans satisfying A1±A3 which are not outcome equivalent.
Hence, in general, it is not guaranteed that players coordinate their
behaviour. Not only do axioms A1±A3 not select a set of plans that is
outcome equivalent in case a game has mutiple pay-off equivalent Nash
equilibria, they may also fail to select between outcome non-equivalent
plans in case the game has a Nash equilibrium that is better for both
players than all other Nash equilibria, but is itself not Pareto-efficient.
Recall from the Introduction, that Bacharach's version seems to select the
most efficient Nash equilibrium. In the example of Table 1, there is a plan
that supports the outcome (U,L), for example, one that specifies that
players conjecture the other player to randomize with probability 1/3
over all actions.
In summary, the proposition provides a possible justification for the
uniqueness version of the Principle of Coordination, but it does not
provide support for the other versions mentioned in the Introduction.
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4. DISCUSSION
I realize that the Principle of Coordination is a controversial principle. In
this section I discuss some of the possible critiques along two lines: (i)
coordination is assumed rather than explained; (ii) what is the relation-
ship to risk dominance? The purpose of the discussion is to make the
argument more transparent by describing what is entailed, and espe-
cially, what is not.
Before I do so, however, it is important to realize that even the
weakest solution concepts that are employed in non-cooperative game
theory, like iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) or
rationalizability, have individual players impose restrictions on the likely
behavior of others (see Bernheim, 1984 and Pearce, 1984). The common
knowledge of rationality assumption on which IEDS is based assumes
that all players conjecture (or even: know) other players to be as rational
as they are. It is clear that this assumption imposes restrictions beyond
the simple notion of rational individual behavior. Nevertheless, the
assumption is well accepted in non-cooperative game theory, so much so
that it is hard to encounter justifications for it. One way to interpret the
assumption is that while thinking about what the other may choose,
players impose their own kind of rationality on their opponents.
According to this interpretation the assumption only imposes restrictions
on the thought processes of individual players (see Janssen, 1998b).
Hence, one may defend the thesis that the considerations that lead to the
notion of IEDS are purely individualistic in nature and do not involve
any notion of team thinking.
The requirement I impose in addition, namely, that plans be optimal,
can be justified along similar lines. Each player formulates an individual
plan. To be reasonable, a plan fulfills a requirement that goes beyond
individual rationality. While thinking about what others may choose,
players come to the conclusion that some actions may unambiguously be
in their mutual interest. If a player of the game has to come up with a
plan that stipulates what both players will do, he should formulate the
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L M R
U 7,7 5,8 7,4
C 8,5 6,6 0,0
R 4,7 0,0 4,4
TABLE 1. An ef®cient Nash equilbrium relative to the set of all Nash
equilibria may not be the unique plan satisfying A1±A3.
best possible plan taking into account that players act in their own
interest. Any other plan hurts him as well as the other player and is
difficult to support in a conversation that may follow after the game has
been played. This consideration imposes restrictions on the reasoning
process individual players go through before adoping a plan. Hence,
axiom A3 can be justified as being of an individualistic nature.
Coordination
One possible objection to the Principle of Coordination is that it assumes a
form of coordination instead of explaining it in terms of individual
considerations. The above analysis is, at least partly, able to counter this
criticism. To this end, consider the game of pure coordination given below.
Axioms A1±A3 do not guarantee in any way that players coordinate
in the game in Table 2. One player's plan may involve both players
choosing L and conjecturing that the other will play L, whereas the
second player's plan may specify that both players choose R and
conjecture that the other will play R. As this form of miscoordination is
not excluded by A1±A3, I conclude that the Principle of Coordination
that follows from A1±A3 does not assume coordination.11
More generally, if there are multiple equilibria that cannot be Pareto-
ranked, then A1±A3 do not guarantee that players coordinate their
actions on a Nash equilibrium. This is important as some authors have
assumed that players can coordinate on one of the Pareto-efficient
equilibria in case of multiplicity. Bacharach (1993, p. 266), for example,
assumes that players choose Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium
strategy combinations. A similar problem arises in the analysis of
Crawford and Haller (1990, p. 575) who assume that players can
maintain coordination in an infinitely repeated version of Table 2 if they
have coordinated once. As there are potentially many different ways in
which players can maintain coordination, and as each of these ways is
equivalent in terms of pay-offs, our analysis does not provide founda-
tions for this assumption (see Goyal and Janssen, 1996).
We can take this point further and argue that even in the case of a
unique Nash equilibrium, our approach does not guarantee that players
coordinate their choices on the equilibrium point. The example in Table 3
(a variation on a game due to Bernheim (1984)) makes this clear. Each
player has three strategies from which to choose and each of these
strategies is a rational choice given some conjecture. Moreover, there is
no rational plan that is suboptimal. Hence, axioms A1±A3 do not impose
restrictions on the possible choices players make. There is, however, only
one Nash equilibrium, namely (C,M).
The latter example also makes clear the difference between Jacobson
11 A similar conclusion follows when considering a game like the battle of the sexes.
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(1996) and the present paper. Jacobson requires plans to be internally
consistent in the sense that players do not consider the possibility that
the other player uses a different plan. This implicitly assumes that
players believe they will coordinate. Requiring plans to be internally
consistent, Jacobson (1996), shows that when there is a unique Nash
equilibrium, individuals will coordinate on it. Applying his approach to
the example in Table 3 implies that players will choose their part of the
Nash equilibrium (C,M). My approach, in contrast, does not impose any
restriction in that example. Indeed, if we have no grounds for assuming
that players will coordinate, then we also have no grounds for assuming
that players believe they will coordinate. Accordingly, there does not
seem to be a good reason to impose the axiom of internal consistency on
individual plans.
Risk Dominance
A second possible objection to the Principle of Coordination may be that
it does not hold when there is a conflict between Pareto-efficiency and
risk dominance. An example is given in Table 4. In that figure there are
two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (T,L) is Pareto-efficient and (B,R)
is risk dominant.12
Recent literature in game theory has resulted in conditions under
which players are expected to play the risk dominant rather than the
12 An equilibrium is risk dominant if both players' best response remains unchanged as
long as the opponent chooses the equilibrium strategy with a probability at least equal to
0.5.
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L R
L 1,1 0,0
R 0,0 1,1
TABLE 2. A game of pure coordination.
L M R
U 0,7 2,5 7,0
C 5,2 3,3 5,2
R 7,0 2,5 0,7
TABLE 3. Reasonable plans may involve non-Nash behavior.
Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) consider a
framework in which players observe pay-offs with some noise and show
that (under some conditions) the risk dominant equilibrium survives
IEDS. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993), among others,
study a population of agents interacting in an evolutionary environment
and show that the risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run.
The circumstances I consider in this paper do not fit either one of
these environments. This paper provides an eductive justification for the
Principle of Coordination in case the game structure, including the pay-
off, is common knowledge. In particular, the justification for the axiom of
optimality (A3) I have developed at the end of Section 2 does not hold in
these other environments. Two elements are important in this justifica-
tion. First, there is a fair chance that agents can hold the other
accountable for their actions when they meet after they have played the
game. Second, the accountability for actions is based on common
knowledge of pay-offs. Olga, at the end of Section 2, could argue: `Listen,
Soren, we both know the pay-offs for sure and we know that the other
does. Hence, we know that the pay-offs each one of us would get under
your plan are lower than the pay-offs we would get under my plan . . .'.
The literature mentioned above considers other environments and I do
not want to argue that the Principle of Coordination should apply in
each and every possible situation. When there is no common knowledge
about pay-offs (as in the Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) framework), or
when there is almost no chance that she can be held accountable for my
actions (as in evolutionary game theory), Olga does not have reasons to
(expect to be able to) start a conversation in this way. Hence, the
justification for A3 fails in these environments.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has tried to clarify the Principle of Coordination by providing
three axioms from which the Principle follows. By doing so, I have been
able to tell what the Principle entails and what it does not, making the
controversy around the Principle more transparent. For example, the
Principle does not tell players in a prisoner's dilemma game to
cooperate. Also, it does not solve the battle of the sexes, nor coordination
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L R
L 10,10 4,7
R 7,4 8,8
TABLE 4. A con¯ict between Pareto-ef®ciency and risk dominance.
games where the Nash equilibria have identical pay-offs. In this way the
paper discriminates between different versions of the Principle of
Coordination. The axioms mentioned here only support a `uniqueness'
version of the Principle, which basically says that if a unique Pareto-
efficient outcome exists in a game, then rational players will choose their
part of that outcome.
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